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1.  Introduction 
This paper outlines a two-period dynamic game. The objective is to study an 
industry structure in which economic agents (players or firms) noncooperatively find an 
optimal way to produce a homogeneous good and make capacity investments in production 
under uncertainty and incomplete information. Specifically we consider that demand for a 
product is uncertain and that the exact functional form of demand may not be known to the 
players (or players have no perfect foresight of it). Moreover each player only knows his 
own production capacity levels, and production and investment costs of several 
technologies, but not the rivals’ information. In this setting we address the question of how 
equilibrium outcomes might be formed in the market. Suppose that an auctioneer procures 
the homogeneous good that is produced by firms. We assume multiple interactions 
between players and the auctioneer before optimal (production and capital investment) 
decisions are made. During each communication players simultaneously reveal their 
willingness to produce quantities to the auctioneer who then determines the price at the 
level of total quantity supplied. Firms solve their ‘sub-problems’ to determine their 
quantities and ultimately a set of ‘artificial equilibrium’ outcomes is obtained in each 
communication period. We call this setting a finitely repeated feedback (FB) game and 
explain the details of this game in the following section.  
The rules and equilibrium concept of the FB game are different than the ones in the                             
literature. For instance the structure of the FB game may recall ‘communication equilibria’  
and/or ‘rational learning equilibria’, in which players learn how to play Nash equilibrium 
with or without complete information in finitely and infinitely repeated games. Forges 
(1986) proposed extensive form correlated equilibrium and communication equilibrium 
games in which players were allowed to observe private signals and to transmit inputs at   2
every stage (of the event tree) to a correlation device.  He showed that payoffs associated 
with these equilibrium concepts are equivalent to those of Nash equilibrium. In these 
equilibrium concepts, players communicate with each other during preplay or intraplay 
stages. Mertens et al. (1990) surveys the literature regarding how players learn to play 
Nash equilibrium in repeated games.  Kalai and Lehrer (1993) study an infinitely repeated 
game with discounting in which players are subjectively rational: if a player’s belief about 
a rival’s strategies is compatible then, by means of Bayesian updating, players’ strategies 
will converge to the Nash equilibrium outcome in the long run. Kalai and Lehrer criticize 
other models [by Selten (1991), Milgrom and Roberts (1991), and Fudenberg and Levine 
(1993a)] since these models restrict the behavior of players to be myopic and bounded.  
This paper also has equilibrium computational aspects.  We show that FB game 
equilibrium outcomes converge to dynamic Cournot-Nash (CN) equilibrium outcomes 
under demand uncertainty. This correspondence may also be considered as computing CN 
outcomes algorithmically in a different space such that both spaces have different 
information structures and rules.  
Finding and/or computing Nash equilibria has been studied since 1950s for both 
normal and extensive form games. Von Stengel (2002) surveys the exposition of linear 
methods used to find equilibrium for two-person games. For a survey of nonlinear methods 
for computing Nash equilibria for more than two player noncooperative games see 
McKelvey and McLennan (1996). The algorithms designed for solving Nash equilibrium 
outcomes mostly deal with small-scale optimization problems in game-theoretical settings. 
For example, Uryasev and Rubinstein (1994) consider a special class of numerical 
algorithms, the so-called relaxation algorithm, to compute Nash equilibrium points in 
noncooperative games. Belenkii et al. (1974), Basar (1987), and Li and Basar (1987)   3
studied relaxation algorithms for deterministic games, where fixed-point theorems are used 
to check equilibrium convergence conditions. Basar (1987) and Li and Basar (1987) 
proved convergence for a two-player static game via a contraction-mapping theorem. For 
linear-quadratic settings, it may be relatively easy to check the convergence conditions. 
However, for other nonlinear payoff functions with coupled constraints, it may be 
intractable to check these conditions. Uryasev and Rubinstein proposed a different 
approach to tackle the problem for nonlinear functions. They utilize “the residual terms” of 
the Nikaido-Isoda (1955) function. They show convergence of the algorithm via non-
smooth weakly convex/concave Nikaido-Isoda functions. The usefulness of their 
methodology was discussed only for static games without constraints. Krawczyk and 
Uryasev (2000) study another algorithm to solve a multi-player, non-zero-sum dynamic 
game with coupled constraints. Krawczyk and Uryasev introduce an improvement to the 
relaxation algorithm by implementing the steepest-descent step-size control technique. 
They prove the convergence of their algorithm and test it on a several problems. They 
specifically apply their procedure to a river basin pollution problem with coupled 
environmental constraints and show that the algorithm demonstrates fast convergence for a 
wide range of parameters.  Their algorithm minimizes a multivariate Nikaido-Isoda 
function by using a standard nonlinear programming routine at each level of iteration.  
            In this paper the FB game has two main features. First, from the computational 
point of view, it may be considered as an algorithm (game) to compute CN equilibrium 
outcomes. As an algorithm, but not from the point of view of the informational structure 
and rules, it resembles the work of Krawczyk and Uryasev (2000), although we use a much 
simpler algorithm. Second, it shows how a communication scheme under incomplete 
information leads to an equilibrium whose outcomes may be obtained via a dynamic game   4
structure in which there is no communication and/or learning but players have full 
knowledge about rivals’ strategies and full information about all parameters of the game.   
  The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the correspondence 
between one period FB and CN production games with symmetric and asymmetric players 
that have coupled constraints. Section 3 extends the procedure to two periods and 
considers capacity investment in production under demand uncertainty and presents an 
illustrative example. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Model 
In Section 2.1 we show how our approach is implemented for one-period production 
oligopoly (FB and CN) games. In Section 2.2 we study these games with capacity 
constraints.  
2.1 One-period oligopoly games 
2.1.1 Finitely repeated feedback (FB) game 
2.1.1.1 Timing 
Let  c t  denote a communication period. Let τ  denote a production period.   
Communication period:  c t τ < . 
Production period:  0 τ = . 
The communication period precedes the production period and is represented, without loss 
of generality, by integers. To not deal with negative numbers let   c tt =  such that 
1,2,..., tT = , where T <∞. Here t denotes iteration period.  
2.1.1.2 Description of the FB game  
Consider an oligopoly with  2 n ≥  profit-maximizing-firms who produce a homogeneous 
product so that each player faces the same price in the market. Each player has a   5
differentiable cost function. In a given period of time each player is not sure how much to 
produce since market price and demand are both unknown. Each one starts with a quantity 
that he may be willing to produce. These quantities are submitted to the auctioneer, who 
procures the good and knows the market demand (or has a perfect forecast for the 
demand). We assume that communication between the auctioneer and firms is costless. 
Given these submitted quantities, the auctioneer calculates the price (that buyers are 
willing to pay for the total quantity supplied) and delivers it to the players. Then each 
player solves his own sub-problem that maximizes his ‘regularized’ payoff function for the 
quantities he wants to produce at this price level. After that, each player truthfully submits 
a quantity which is a convex combination of the previous and current quantities.  The 
auctioneer uses these new quantities to calculate a new candidate market price. It is called 
a candidate price since the players may not agree to produce at that price. Again each firm 
gets this new price and solves his optimization problem. This process continues until the 
candidate market price and/or proposed quantities at iteration t is approximately equal to 
the price and the quantities at iteration t-1. We note that during this finitely repeated 
interaction between the players and the auctioneer, players do not observe the rivals’ 
submitted quantity levels directly, nor does the candidate market price reflect the 
opponents’ outputs directly since the exact functional form of the demand is unknown to 
the players. It is clear that iteration t output levels are a function of the past candidate 
market prices.     
We call the above process the finitely repeated feedback (FB) game because prior to the 
actual production at a given period players interact finitely many times with the auctioneer 
and exchange information about the candidate market outcomes before they decide how 
much to actually produce.   6
Algorithmically the FB game is defined as follows.  
Step 0. (Initialization) Each firm i ( 1,2,..., in = , where nN < ) selects  ,0 0 i q ≥  arbitrarily at 
the beginning and the auctioneer calculates a candidate market price  0 P  and submits this to 
the firms.  
Step 1.  (Solving sub-problems) Each firm solves the following sub-problem in every 
iteration:  
                        
,
1, , , 0 max ( ) ( )
it
ti t i t i t q Pq c q fq − ≥ −−                        (1) 
Let the solution sequence be 
*
, () it i q  at iteration t. Note that here  1 t P−  is a fixed number, not 
a function of quantities.  
Step 2. (Communication and keeping track of short-term memories) Each player computes 
the following: 
*
,, 1 , (1 ) it it it qq q α α − =− + , where t represents iteration, ( 1,2,..., tT = , where 
T <∞), and  () 0,2/( 1) n α ∈+ . The auctioneer calculates the new price,  t P  by using  , () it i q .  
 Step  3. (Stopping criteria) Let  12 , ξ ξ  be sufficiently small positive real numbers. If   
**
,, 11 || it it qq ξ − −<  and/or    12 || tt PP ξ − −<   hold, then stop, otherwise repeat Step 1 and Step 
2.   , 
Definition 2.1. The set of exchanged candidate prices and quantities  ,, (, ) ti t i t Pq  defined 
above is called artificial equilibria of the sub-problems defined in the expression (1). 
It is observed that, by mathematical induction, the formulation in step 2 at iteration 
T  becomes, 
                       
1
*
,, 0 ,
0
(1 ) (1 )
T
Tt
iT i iT t
t
qq q αα α
−
−
=
=− + − ∑ .                    (2)     
   7
We call the payoff function in (1) the ‘regularized’ profit function, since the price is 
constant and it has an additional term - the ‘regularization’ function  f (.), which may be 
any polynomial function. (We note that the function f  (.) is chosen to allow any 
differentiable cost functions including affine cost functions. If the cost function is affine, 
then the function  f (.) entails the first order condition of  (1) to be a function of  q. 
Alternatively, if we exclude affine cost functions then we may discard the function f (.) in 
(1)).  However, for the sake of computational simplicity the function  f (.) is chosen to be 
of the smallest order, ( ( (.)) 1 of ′ = ), so that even if the cost function is linear, the first order 
condition for (1) will be a function of  q. Hence, without loss of generality let 
2 1
(.) i f q
γ
= , 
where 0 γ > . Taking a convex combination of the quantities in Step 2 may be referred to 
as keeping track of short-term memories. Thus, each player uses all the information that he 
collects to reach optimal final decisions. We assume that each player uses the same 
weighting scheme (α ), and it is constant. If n is large then each player puts little weight on 
the quantity
*
i q . In (1) it is not required to optimize and update α  for each iteration, as 
opposed to the ‘steepest-descent-method’ (see Bertsekas (1999)). With regard to the 
economic importance of α , if the number of players is large then players put more weights 
on their previously proposed quantities. This has two advantages. First, it is possible that 
the other players have started with some initial quantities that are far away from the 
optimal ones. Then, the price obtained from the auctioneer will reflect this fact and hence 
for a player the possible production quantity with this given price will be off. If the number 
of players is large, then that α  choice will alleviate the initialization problem.   Second, 
when the number of players is large they may need to collect more information (through 
price) about rivals’ strategies before they choose their optimal actions. Hence they   8
cautiously put little weight on their current plans. As they get more information, the 
weights of very past actions do gradually decrease. However, if the number of players gets 
small then the interval of α  enlarges, and hence players can put more value on their 
current strategies.  
2.1.2 A Cournot-Nash (CN) game 
2.1.2.1 Timing 
Before production takes place each firm has complete information about market demand 
and rivals’ costs. Since this is a one-shot game no capital investment is considered. 
Production period:  0 τ = . 
2.1.2.2 Description of the CN game  
Consider an oligopoly market with  2 n ≥  firms such that each firm’s cost function is 
convex and differentiable, and firms face a linear demand. Let  ( ) PQ be the inverse 
demand function which determines the price of output as a function of total production; 
this is a strictly decreasing function of the total quantity of production in the market. 
Specifically, let  ( ) PQ D Q =− be the inverse demand with a constant  0 D > . Each player 
produces the same quality of the good and has no capacity constraint. Later we will 
consider capacity constraints. Assume that firms compete a la Cournot and know their 
rivals’ costs. Under these assumptions, when each player maximizes his profit function, 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium outcomes will prevail in the market since the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium already presupposes that firms have an accurate knowledge about the 
opponents’ cost functions.  Formally, each player i solves the following maximization 
problem.     
max ( ) ( )
.. , , 0
i
ii q
ii i
PQq cq
st q Q P Q D q
−
=+ = ≥ ∑
       9
The first order necessary condition for player i yields  ii qP c ′ = −   for an interior solution.  
A symmetric CN equilibrium with identical cost firms implies  ( 1) ( ) 0 Dn q c q ′ − +− = . 
Denote the quantity that solves this equality as 
c q .  
The following proposition relates the outcomes of FB and CN games given the 
information structures of the games as defined above. 
Proposition 2.1.  For  2 n ≥  player symmetric oligopoly, the equilibrium market outcomes 
of the finitely repeated feedback (FB) game converge to the equilibrium market outcomes 
of the CN game. 
Proof.  We want to show that  ,
c
iT i qq →  for some T < ∞ .  Since we assume that players are 
symmetric we will drop the subscript i hereafter. Let   0
c qq ε = + , where ε  is a real 
number, then  0 ()
c PD n qε =− +. Also let, without loss of generality,  2 γ =  in (1). Solution 
of the expression (1) at the first iteration yields 
**
10 1 () qP c q ′ =− . Then a player obtains, 
 
*
10 1 1
1
(1 ) ( ( 1) ( )) (1 ( 1) )
(1 ( 1) )
cc c
c
qq q D n q c q n q a
nq a
α αα ε α α
εα α
′ =− + = −+ − + −+ + −
=− + + −
 
where 
*
11 () ()
c ac qc q ′′ =−. The first equality comes from Step 2, the second equality is 
because of the appropriate substitutions, and the final equality is due to 
(1 ) ( ) 0
cc Dn qc q ′ −+ − = . The new price at the first iteration becomes  11 PD n q =− . Let 
(1 ) znα =+ , then the above equation can be rewritten as  11 (1 )
c qz q a ε α =− + − . Let 
* () ()
c
tt ac qc q ′′ =−,  t = 1,…,T.  Similarly, by following this process for the second 
iteration we obtain 
*2
21 2 1 2 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
c qq q z q a z a α αε α α =− + = − + − −− . Assume that 
1 11
1 1 (1 ) (1 )
T Tc T t
Tt t qz q a z εα
− −− −
− = =− + − − ∑ , then we need to show that   10
1 (1 ) (1 )
T Tc T t
Tt t qz q a z εα
−
= =− + − − ∑ .  At the iteration T, 
*
1 (1 ) TT T qq q α α − =− +  holds, 
where 
**
1 () TT T qP c q − ′ =− ,  11 TT PD n q −− =− . Then,  
*
11 1
11 11 1
11
1
(1 ) ( ( 1) )
(1 ) [1 ( 1)] (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )
TT T T T
TT Tc T t T t
tT i tt
T Tc T i
t t
qq q D n q c q
zn q z a z a a z
zq a z
αα α
εα α α α
εα
−− −
−− −− − − −
==
−
=
′ =− + = −+ − +
=− − + + + − − − −
=− + − −
∑∑
∑
 
Let min( ) tt aa = , then 
1 (1 ) (1 ) ((1 ) 1) (1 )
T Tc T t c T T
T t qz q a z q z z εα ε ε
−
= ′ ≤− + − − = + − −+ − ∑ , where  /( 1) an ε′ =+ . 
Choose ((1 ) 1) (1 )
TT zz ξε ε ′ =− − + − , which is a small number. Hence for some iteration 
T <∞, and with the tolerance level ξ ,  
c
T qq → . , 
In the above proof as it can be seen,  T q  is a separable function of 
* () ()
c
T cq cq ′′ − , and 
since convergence of 
* () T cq ′  to  ( )
c cq ′  is shown here, in the following proofs we will 
shortly write  (1 ) 0 Dn q c ′ −+ −= . , 
Next we extend the result of the above proposition to an asymmetric duopoly in 
which players have different costs. First we write the following Lemma. 
Lemma 2.1. Let  m A  and  m B  be two series with an index m∈`. Suppose that 
0 mm AB +→ . If  0 mm AB −→  then  0 m A →  and  0 m B → .  
Proof. A straightforward proof for this lemma is as follows. For a given  0 ζ >  we want to 
show that  m A ζ < . There exist indices  12 , NN∈` such that for 1 mN > ,  mm ABζ +<  and 
for 2 mN > ,  mm AB ζ −< . Summation of  mm AB ζ ζ − <+<  and  mm AB ζ ζ − <−<  implies 
m A ζ < .  Then  0 m B →  holds since  0 mm AB + → . ,   11
Proposition 2.2.  For asymmetric duopoly, the equilibrium market outcomes of the finitely 
repeated feedback (FB) game converge to the equilibrium market outcomes of the CN 
game. 
Proof.  Let  ,0
c
ii i qq ε =+, for  1, 2 i = . Then the initial price is  01 2 1 2
cc PD qqε ε = −−−−. Let 
2 γ =  in (1).  The first iteration solution of (2) yields 
*
0 ii qP c ′ = − . Then by suitable 
substitutions we obtain, 
            
*
1,1 1,0 1,1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1
11 2 1
(1 ) ( 2 ) (1 ) ( )
(1 ) ( ) ,
cc c
c
qq q D q q c q
q
αα α ε α α ε ε
εα α ε ε
′ =− + = − − − + − − + +
=− − + +
. 
where the first subscript refers to a player, the second subscript refers to iteration and  
c
i q denotes the CN equilibrium quantity for player i.  Similarly the first iteration quantity  
for player 2 is,  
              2,1 2 1 2 2 (1 ) ( )
c qq εα α ε ε =− −+ + . 
Given these two quantities the price becomes  11 , 1 2 , 1 PD q q =− − . Using a similar analogy, 
the second iteration quantities for both players turn out to be 
22
1,2 1 1 2 (5 4 1) (4 2 )
c qq ε αα ε αα =+ − + + − ,  
22
2,2 2 2 1 (5 4 1) (4 2 )
c qq ε αα ε αα =+ − + + − , 
with the price 21 , 2 2 , 2 PD q q =− − .  Similarly one can obtain other iteration results.  
Case 1. Assume  12 ε εε == . Then the proof is the same as the proof of Proposition 2.1. 
 Case 2. Assume  12 ε ε ≠ . Let  12 k ε ε = +  be for some k∈\ . Then, 
1,1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 (1 ) ( ) ( )(1 2 ) ( ) ( 1)( 1)
cc c qq q k q z k A εα α ε ε ε α ε α ε =− − + + = + +−+ − = + −−+ , 
where  1 12 A α =−  is a residual. For the second iteration it is obtained that 
22
1,2 1 2 2 (1 )( 1 )
c qq z k A ε =+ − − + , where 
2
2 54 1 A αα = −+ . Similarly the first iteration for 
the second player leads to  2,1 2 2 1 (1 ) ( 1 )
c qq z k B ε =+ − − + , where  1 B α = − , for the second   12
iteration 
22
2,2 2 2 2 (1 )( 1 )
c qq z k B ε =+ − − + , where 
2
2 42 B α α =− . Observe that 
11 (1 ) ( 1 ) AB z += − − , 
22
22 (1 )( 1 ) AB z + =− − ,  11 (1 ) ( 1 ) AB α −= − − , 
and
22
22 (1 )( 1 ) AB α −= − −. By mathematical induction it is easily shown that at the T
th  
iteration ( 1) ( 1)
TT
TT AB z += − − and  ( 1) ( 1)
TT
TT AB α − =− − . Now we show that 
1, 1 2 (1 )( 1 )
cTT
TT qq z k A ε =+ − − +  and  2, 2 2 (1 )( 1 )
cTT
TT qq z k B ε =+ − − + . Assume that 
11
1, 1 1 2 1 (1 ) ( 1 )
cT T
TT qq z k A ε
−−
−− =+ − − +  and 
11
2, 1 2 2 1 (1 ) ( 1 )
cT T
TT qq z k B ε
−−
− − =+ − − + . Clearly 
*
1, 1, 1 1, (1 ) TT T qq q αα − =− + , where 
*
1, 1 1 TT qPc − ′ = −  and  11 , 1 2 , 1 TT T PD q q − −− =− − . Substitution of  
these terms leads to  1, 1 2 1 1 1 (1 )( 1 ) ( )
cTT
TT T T qq z k AB k A εα − −− =+ − − + + + . Because of the 
result of the Lemma 2.1 and given that  2 ε  is constant and  11 z − < ,  then for some T 
1, 1
c
T qq → . Using similar arguments as we used before we also obtain that  2, 2
c
T qq →  for the 
second player. ,  
2.2 One-period oligopoly games with capacity constraints 
In what follows we keep the structure of the FB and CN games and add capacity 
constraints to the production stage. Specifically the optimization problem of player i in the 
CN game will be, 
max ( ) ( )
.. , , , 0
i qi i
ii i i
i
PQq cq
st q K q Q P Q D q
−
≤= + = ≥ ∑
               
where  i K  is the capacity constraint of player i. 
The following proposition shows how the FB game may be used to compute the 
equilibrium outcomes in the capacity-constrained CN game.  
Proposition 2.3.  For symmetric capacity-constrained oligopolies, the quantities and prices 
obtained from the FB game will converge to the equilibrium outcomes of the CN game.   13
Proof. We will prove this proposition for symmetric duopolies, an extension of it to many 
players is similar. The first order necessary conditions of the maximization problem for a 
player for an interior solution satisfies  3 0
cc Dqc λ ′ − −− = with a complementarity 
condition ( ) 0
cc Kq λ −= , where ( , )
cc q λ is the pair of CN equilibrium quantity and the 
shadow price of the inequality constraint. Next we implement the FB game as follows. Let 
each player initially submit production quantity  0
c qq ε = +  to the auctioneer who sets the 
price as 0 2( )
c PD qε =− +. Then each player solves (1), say for 2 γ = , and the first iteration 
solution yields 
**
10 1 qP c λ ′ =− −, and 
**
11 () 0 Kq λ − = . Assume that 
*
11
c λ λη =+  for some 
number  1 η . Then a player computes 
*
10 1 1 (1 ) (1 3 ) ( )
c qq q q α αεα η α = −+ = − + + − , where 
*
11 () () 0
c Kq λη +− =  holds. The second iteration of the algorithm yields 
**
21 2 qP c λ ′ =−−, 
where  11 2 PD q =− , and 
*
22
c λ λη = + . By suitable substitutions, 
*2 2
21 2 1 2 (1 ) (1 3 ) (3 ) ( )
c qq q q α αεα η α α η α =− + = − + + − + −, with 
*
22 () ( ) 0
c Kq λη +− = . 
By mathematical induction it is shown that at the iteration T 
1
(1 ) (1 ) ,
T
Tc T j
Tj
j
qz q z ε αη
−
=
=−+ − − ∑   
where  3 z α = , 
* () ( ) 0
c
jj Kq λη +− =  for all j, and 
*
j q  is the solution of (1) at iteration j.  
Next we show that the third term in  T q approaches to zero as T increases.  
From the complementarity conditions we can solve for  j η  for all  j. For the first iteration, 
**
11 1 01 1 1
*
11 1 1
0 ( )( ) ( )( ( )) ( )( 2 )
(2 ) 2 ( ) 2
cc c c
cc c c c
Kq K Pc K q
Kq K q
λη λη λ λη ε η
η ε η λ λε η λ λε
′ =+ −=+ −− − =+ + + −
=+ + − + +=− + +
   14
1 *
1
2
c
c Kq
λ ε
η
λ
−
⇒=
−+
. Note that  1 2 η ε ≤ . By using similar arguments as used above, for 
the second iteration we obtain, 
1
2 1 *
1
[2 (1 3 ) 2 ( )
2 ( 13)2 2 ( 13 2) 2 ( 1 )
c
c Kq
λε α ηα
η εα α ηεα αε α
λ
−− + −
=≤ − + ≤ − + = −
−+
. 
Again by mathematical induction it is easily shown that, 
1 2 (1 ) , 1,2,...,
j
j jT ηε α
− ≤− = . By triangular inequality, 
11
11 1
11
(1 ) (1 )
2( 1 3 ) ( 1 ) 2( 1 ) 2 ( 1 )
TT
Tj Tj
jj
jj
TT
Tj j T T
jj
zz
T
αη α η
αε α α αε α αε α
−−
==
− −− −
==
−≤ −
≤− − ≤− = −
∑∑
∑∑
 
Here 
1 2( 1 )0
T T αε α
− −→  as T increases, since  1 α <  and ε  is fixed.  Thus 
1
(1 ) (1 )
T
Tc T j c
Tj
j
qz q z q εα η
−
=
=−+ − − → ∑ . , 
Next we generalize the above findings to two-period oligopolies that make 
investment in production capacity under demand uncertainty.  
3.  Two-period oligopoly games 
3.1 A Cournot-Nash game (CN) under uncertainty 
3.1.1 Timing 
Capital investments from several technologies are here-and-now decisions made under 
demand uncertainty and will be available for use in period 1. 
Production and investment period:  0 τ = . 
Production period:  1 τ = . 
3.1.2 Description of the CN game    15
Consider a class of dynamic oligopolistic games in which players make capital investment 
and production decisions under uncertainty about future demand for a homogeneous 
product. In this game, we represent the demand uncertainty by a finite number of scenarios 
on a tree. Each scenario from root to terminal node represents a possible realization of a 
random process. It is assumed that in the beginning of the game all players share a 
common characterization of the random process. Moreover, this is a complete information 
game such that each player knows its own possible strategies, production and investment 
cost functions, initial capacities, and its rivals’ information. We employ S-adapted open-
loop Nash equilibrium solution paradigm. Every firm is risk neutral and maximizes its 
expected payoff. Given the initial capacity levels, in period 0 each firm makes its initial 
production decisions to maximize current profit, and chooses its investment in production 
capacity. These investments will be available in use for production in period 1. However 
demand scenarios for period 1 are stochastic and investment decisions must be made in 
period 0. After uncertainty is resolved in period 1, players make their production decisions. 
Any investment opportunities in period 1 will not be considered since the game ends at that 
stage. 
Assume that each player accurately predicts the market with the discrete random walk 
process illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Two-period demand scenarios 
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where , 0 D δ > and  δ  is the random outcome of the uncertainty. Also let the “up-state” 
probability be U and the “down-state” probability be 1-U.   
Let  ,1 ,2 , ( , ,..., ) ii i i m KK K K
ττ τ τ = , where , ik K
τ ,  k=1,2,…,m, denotes the available capacity at time 
τ  from technology k for firm i. Also let  ) ( i i q c  be the total cost as a function of the vector 
of outputs for all technologies, and  ( ) ii FI  be the total cost of investment for player i, 
where cost functions are differentiable. Then a player’s maximization problem becomes, 
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where  {, } su d ∈ , u and d denote for “up-state” and “down-state” scenarios respectively. A 
player’s expected profit function is: 
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where  0 P  is the initial price and 
1
u P and 
1
d P  are prices in period 1 for the up and down states 
respectively.  
The objective function above maximizes the initial period profit plus the expected profit of 
the future. Because of (3.3), equilibrium conditions are imposed for each time period and 
scenario. The constraint (3.6) enforces the non-anticipativity (non-clairvoyance) condition, 
which implies that investment decisions must be implemented before the outcome of the   17
random variable is observed. In the equation (3.6), E refers to “expectation operator”. We 
note that this game setting is also studied in Genc, Reynolds and Sen (2005). 
3.2   Finitely repeated feedback (FB) game under uncertainty 
3.2.1 Timing 
Let  c t  and  c t ′ denote communication periods. Let τ  denote a production period. Again to 
avoid dealing with negative numbers let   c tt =  such that  1,2,..., tT = , where T <∞, and t 
denotes iteration period.  
Communication period:  0 c t < . 
Production and investment period:  0 τ = . 
Communication period:  0 0| 1 c t τ = ′ << . 
Production period:  1 τ = . 
3.2.2 Description of the FB game under uncertainty 
The description of the two-period FB game under demand uncertainty is in the same vein 
as the one-period FB game. The only difference is that capital investment takes place in the 
initial period. In period 0 each player chooses the capital investment quantity to meet the 
next period demand, which is uncertain. However, this chosen investment quantity is 
probably sub-optimal. In period 1 uncertainty is resolved and each player chooses 
production quantities similar to the process described in period 0, subject to total available 
capacity which is the summation of initial capacity plus the investment level chosen in 
period 0.  Each player solves his sub-problem for each level of investment which results in 
artificial equilibrium quantities. To obtain globally optimal production quantities, each 
player iterates investment levels until the marginal cost of investment covers the 
summation of the shadow prices (opportunity cost) of production constraints. We assume   18
whichever scenario occurs in period 1, players will stick to the strategies (production and 
investment decisions) that they have chosen in period 0. That is, planning and decisions for 
the future periods are made only during the initial period (period 0). That assumption 
corresponds to the open-loop Nash equilibrium concept used in the CN game under 
uncertainty.   
            To algorithmically solve the two-period CN game under uncertainty, we revise and 
add a few steps to the finitely repeated feedback game introduced in Section 2.1. Before 
period 0 each player follows Step 0 through Step 3 to obtain the initial-period artificial 
equilibrium points. They are irrelevant to period 0 investment and period 1 production 
decisions. At the same time each player i also chooses an investment level  ,0 0 i I ≥  that he 
considers to make. For that given level of investment, for each scenario, each player 
follows procedures similar to those described in Step 0 through Step 3 to choose the 
quantities, but in Step 1 he solves  
  ,,
2
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1
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its i i
hP q c q q
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where  h = {U,1-U} denote scenario probabilities. Note that in the one-period game there is 
no scenario, hence h = 1.  
We add the following step to have stopping criteria for the capital investment 
planning/iteration process. 
Step 4. (Adding capacity) Iteration of investment levels continues until 
,, , ,
,,
,,
() () im im im im
ims s
im im
FI FI
II
λ
′′
′
−
=
− ∑  is satisfied, where ,, im im IIµ ′ = + , µ  is a small number, 
, mm ′ stand for iterations on investment I, and F(.) denotes the investment cost. The λ    19
represents the shadow price of the production constraint. Step 4 means that capital 
investment will increase incrementally until the cost of doing so does not exceed the total 
benefit from the increase in production. We note that with different cost and demand 
structures it is possible to see cycles of excess demand and excess supply when the firms 
choose different capacity levels than they would choose in the equivalent CN game before 
convergence.    
  The following proposition shows that under demand uncertainty the CN game 
outcomes are algorithmically approximated by the FB game.  
Proposition 3.1. For the two-stage production-investment symmetric oligopolies under 
uncertainty, the FB game artificial equilibrium outcomes will converge to the CN 
equilibrium outcomes. 
Proof.  This proof is for the case of a duopoly in which each firm has a single technology. 
The proof for the case of many players and multiple technologies is similar. When we form 
the Lagrange function for the problem described in the proposition, we will obtain the 
following first order necessary conditions.  
At initial time period  3 0
cc Dqc λ ′ −− − =   holds with the complementarity condition 
() 0
cc Kq λ −= , where the couple ( , )
cc q λ is the CN equilibrium quantity and the Lagrange 
multiplier of the inequality constraint. Hereafter implementation of the algorithm is similar 
to the one in the proof of Proposition 2.3. At this period, a player chooses a capital 
investment level  0 I , and let it be   0
c I I σ = + , whereσ  is a real number.  
At time 1 for both of the states  [ 3 ] 0
cc
ss hD q c λ ′ − −−=  holds with ( ) 0
cc
ss Kq λ − = , where 
{,} su d ∈ , and a state probability  {, 1 } hU U ∈ − . A player selects his production units 
initially as  0,
c
uu qq ε =+  and  0,
c
dd qq β =+, where , ε β ∈R and  0, 0 s q ≥ .  Prices become   20
0, 2( )
c
uu PD q δε =+ − +  and  0, 2( )
c
dd PD q δβ =− − + . When players solve sub-problems for 
the second step of the algorithm, each one obtains 
**
0, 1, 1, [] 0 uu u u UP c q λ ′ − −−=  and 
**
0, 1, 1, (1 )[ ] 0 dd d d UP c q λ ′ −− − − =  with 
**
1, 0 1, () 0 uu KI q λ + −=  and 
**
1, 0 1, () 0 dd KI q λ + −= . Let 
*
1, 1
c
uu λ λη =+  and 
*
1, 1
c
dd λ λζ =+ , where , tt ηζ∈R such that 
*
, 0 ts λ ≥ ,  1,2,..., tT = .  From 
here the process is similar to the one used before. From the first iteration, one obtains 
1, 1 (1 3 ) ( / )
c
uu qq U εα η α =−+ + −  and  1, 1 (1 3 ) ( /(1 ))
c
dd qq U βα ζ α =−+ + −−. By the second 
iteration, 
22
2, 1 2 (1 3 ) ((3 )/ ) ( / )
c
uu qqU U εα η α α η α =− + + − +−  and 
22
2, 1 2 (1 3 ) ((3 )/(1 )) ( /(1 ))
c
dd qq U U βα ζ α α ζ α =− + + − −+ −−. Similar to the proof of 
Proposition 2.3, one can show that at iteration T, and 
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c
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' max , TT ο = .  Again, by using the proof of Proposition 2.3, it is shown that 
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,
c
uu qq ο →  and  ,
c
dd qq ο → . That is, for each choice of I , ( , )
cc
s ss q λ  is obtained.  Let  m I , 
() mm FI  and  ,
c
ms λ  be iteration m investment level, its cost and the shadow prices of     21
inequality constraints. Note that, here, the first iteration is because of the investment 
choice, and the second type of iteration is due to choosing optimal production quantities 
for each level of investment choice. Here for every investment iteration m,  ,
c
Ts s λ λ →  for 
large T, since  ,
c
Ts s qq → . The Step 4 suggests that once  ,
() () mm m m
ms s
mm
FI FI
II
λ
′′
′
−
=
− ∑ holds 
for some mm ′ >  then  m I  is the optimal investment level. But this is true since 
() ()
()
mm m m
mm
mm
FI FI
FI
II
′′
′
− ′ ≈
−
 and the equilibrium first order necessary condition yields that 
,, ()
cc
ud m um d FI λ λλλ ′ =+→ +  for  0 I > . Hence the result follows. , 
Next we present a simple example to illustrate how the FB game equilibrium 
outcomes converge to the CN game equilibrium outcomes. 
Example 3.1. Consider a four-player market in which each player has two available 
technologies for production of a homogeneous good. Assume affine marginal production 
and investment cost functions. For each player  1,2,3,4 i =  and for each technology 
1, 2 k = , the production marginal cost function follows  ,, , , ik ik ik ik cab q ′ = + , the investment 
marginal cost function follows  ,, , , ik ik ik ik Fgh I ′ = + , where the cost parameters g, h, a, b are 
provided in Table 1. 
 
                    Table 1: Cost coefficients for each player and technology 
 
 
 
 
               Tech 1                  Tech 2
production coeff. investment coeff. production coeff. investment coeff.
Player 1 (1,1) (1,0) (1,1) (1,1)
Player 2 (4,2) (2,0) (2,1) (1,2)
Player 3 (3,4) (0,4) (3,1) (1,3)
Player 4 (4,4) (4,0) (3,1) (1,4)  22
Let each player have 7 units of initial production capacity from each technology. Let the 
demand scenarios in Figure 1 be  D = 90,  10 δ = , and U = 0.5.   
Implementation of the FB game under uncertainty is depicted below. For the sake of 
brevity we only report player 1’s production quantities from technology 1 for periods 0 and 
1, and all players’ expected profit levels versus iterations (the number of information 
exchanges with the auctioneer). In Figure 2 after several oscillations the quantities 
converge to the CN equilibrium quantity levels. In Figure 3 we plot expected profits at the 
optimal investment levels. As can be observed the FB game artificial equilibrium outcomes 
lead to concave-looking expected profit function. Indeed this should be expected since the 
cost functions are quadratic and demand is linear. 
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Figure 2: Convergence of Player 1’s production quantities from tech 1 for  0 τ =  and 
1 τ =  down and up states, respectively. 
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                Figure 3: Convergence of players’ total expected profits. 
 
After several information (i.e., price and quantity) exchanges between players and the 
auctioneer, players produce and invest actual amounts. The number of iterations varies for 
each state and time period. However, in this example, the algorithm converges relatively 
quickly after several iterations. When we make several runs with different 
parameterizations we observe that initialization of the quantities in Step 0 of the FB game 
plays little role in determining whether the CN game equilibrium outcomes are reached. 
Nevertheless it may increase the number of total iterations. This may stem from the fact 
that the short-term memory process (i.e., convex combinations of the quantities) picks up 
the local optimum in each iteration, hence the initialization levels are not very relevant for 
reaching the CN equilibrium quantities.  
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4. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we show market outcome equivalence of two different dynamic games under 
demand uncertainty with different information structures and market rules. The FB game 
setting may be observed in a market where a new product is introduced and exchanged in 
an auction format such that firms do not have full information about their opponents and 
are unable to predict the market demand accurately. If the good is exchanged via an 
auction mechanism under uncertainty, the FB game setting will predict optimal market 
outcomes. We have shown that information exchanges between the auctioneer and the 
players lead to Cournot-Nash equilibrium outcomes, if the firms play according to the FB 
game-setting.  Alternatively, the FB game structure may be considered as an algorithm that 
solves a large-scale CN game by decomposing the individual maximization problem into 
sub-problems. However, there are some limitations to the FB game solution method. For 
example, the algorithm may not converge to equilibrium or it may be inefficient from the 
computational-time point of view if the functional form of demand is complicated. In 
future research we will examine a generalization of the algorithm for different market 
structures. 
 
 
 REFERENCES 
Basar T (1987) Relaxation techniques and asynchronous algorithms for online computation 
of non-cooperative equilibria.  Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 11: 531-549. 
 
Belenkii VZ, Volkonskii VA, Ivankov SA, Pomaranski AB, Shapiro AD (1974) Iterative 
methods in Game Theory and Programming. Nauka, Moscow. 
 
Bertsekas D (1999) Nonlinear programming. Athena Scientific, MA, USA.  
   25
Forges F (1986) An approach to communication equilibria. Econometrica, 54(6):1375-
1385. 
 
Fudenberg D, Levine D (1993) Steady state learning and Nash equilibrium. Econometrica, 
61: 547-573. 
 
Genc TS, Reynolds SS, Sen S (2005) Dynamic oligopolistic games under uncertainty: a 
stochastic programming approach. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 
forthcoming. 
 
Hukuhane N, Kazuo I (1955) Note on non-cooperative convex games. Pacific Journal of 
Mathematics, 5: 807-815. 
 
Kalai E, Lehrer E (1993) Rational learning leads to Nash equilibrium. Econometrica, 
61(5):1019-1045. 
 
Krawczyk JB, Uryasev S (2000) Relaxation algorithms to find Nash equilibria with 
economic applications. Environmental Modeling and Assessment, 5:63-73. 
 
Li S, Basar T (1987) Distributed Algorithms of for the computation of non-cooperative 
equilibria.  Automatica, 23:523-533. 
 
Mertens JF, Sorin S, Zamir S (1994) Repeated games. CORE, discussion paper 9420-9422. 
 
McKelvey RD, McLennan A (1996) Computation of equilibria in finite games. In: Amman 
HM, Kendrick DA, Rust J (eds) Handbook of Computational Economics, 1:87-142, 
Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
 
Milgrom P, Roberts J (1991) Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games. 
Games and Economic Behavior, 3:82-100. 
 
Papavassilopoulos GP (1986) Iterative techniques for the Nash solution in quadratic games 
with unknown parameters. SIAM Journal of Control and Optimization, 34(4):821-834. 
 
Selten R (1991) Anticipatory learning in two person games. In: Selten R (eds) Game 
Equilibrium Models 1. Evolution and Game Dynamics, 98-154, Springer, New York.  
 
Uryasev S, Rubinstein R (1994) On relaxation algorithms in computation of non-
cooperative equilibria. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 39(6). 
 
Von Stengel B (2002) Computing equilibria for two-person games. In: Aumann RJ, Hart S 
(eds) Handbook of Game Theory with Economics Applications, 3:1723-1759, Elsevier, 
Amsterdam. 
 
 